

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 00483 01 OF 04 310754Z

11

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 011536

P R 301930Z JAN 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3645

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS RUFHBS

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 483

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-82

TAGS: PFOR, XT, XF, NATO, ENRG

SUBJECT: 1) BRIEFING NATO ON MIDDLE EAST, AND 2) GENERAL QUESTION  
OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIES

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

REF: (A) STATE 019377 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 017688 (NOTAL),  
(C) STATE 017687 (NODIS), (D) STATE 017633 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: AT JANUARY 30 RESTRICTED NAC RUMSFELD REPEATED FOR THE COUNCIL THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH NATO AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON. BRIEFING WAS EXTREMELY WELL RECEIVED AND ALLIES WERE AGAIN HIGHLY COMPLIMENTARY OF THE SECRETARY'S DIPLOMATIC ACHIEVEMENTS. SEVERAL EXPRESSED SPECIFIC AND UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT FOR THE POLICY THE U.S. IS PURSUING. ALLIES ALSO APPRECIATED FACT THAT ALL THEIR QUESTIONS POSED AT THE JANUARY 18 NAC MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING WERE ANSWERED BY THE SECRETARY.

COMMENT ON THE BRIEFING LED TO A USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF CONSULTATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE GENERALLY AND ON THE MIDDLE EAST PARTICULARLY. DISCUSSION WAS NOTEWORTHY IN THAT:

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00483 01 OF 04 310754Z

A) FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE DIFFICULTIES IN LATE OCTOBER THERE WAS WIDESPREAD FEELING THAT THE U.S. HAS INDEED BEEN FORTHCOMING AND HAS DONE A GOOD JOB OF KEEPING THE ALLIES INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

B) SEVERAL ALLIES AND SECRETARY GENERAL EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE OTHER MEMBERS SHOULD RECIPROCATATE U.S. BRIEFINGS AND INFORM THE COUNCIL OF THEIR SEPARATE BILATERAL ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

C) THE COUNCIL HEARD MENTION OF THE DESIRABILITY OF THE EC-9 MEMBERS COORDINATING POLITICALLY IN THE COUNCIL WHERE EC-9 INTERESTS OVERLAP WITH NATO-15 INTERESTS, AND NO EC-9 MEMBER SPOKE IN OPPOSITION. THE FRENCH PERMREP AND THE FRG CHARGE DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE DISCUSSION AND THE UK PERMREP WAS ONLY INDIRECTLY IN SUPPORT OF THE POINTS B) AND C).  
END SUMMARY.

1. IN RESTRICTED JANUARY 30 COUNCIL MEETING (ONE PLUS ONE) AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD, DRAWING FULLY ON REFTELS, BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH THE NATO AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON. LUNS EXPRESSED THE APPRECIATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE JANUARY 25 MEETING. RECOGNIZING THAT PERMREPS HAD REPORTS FROM THEIR OWN AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON, LUNS EMPHASIZED THE VALUE OF REPEATING THE INFORMATION FOR THE COUNCIL ASSEMBLED, SO THAT AMONG OTHER THINGS ALLIES CAN HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF SEEDING THAT SAME MEETING FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VIEWPOINT.

2. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) EMPHASIZED HIS THANKS TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO RUMSFELD FOR THE BRIEFING, EXPRESSED ADMIRATION AND GRATITUDE AT WHAT THE U.S. HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED AND EXPRESSED BELGIAN SUPPORT FOR U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS AS THEY UNFOLD. HE AGREED WITH LUNS ON THE VALUE OF RUMSFELD REPEATING IN THE COUNCIL WHAT HAD BEEN SAID IN WASHINGTON. HE POINTED OUT FACT THAT SECRETARY GENERAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEE LACK REPRESENTATION WHEN BRIEFING HELD IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WAS HAPPY THAT THE WASHINGTON BRIEFING ANSWERED ALL OF THE QUESTIONS THAT HAD BEEN POSED BY THE PERMREPS AT THE JANUARY 18 MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING IN THE COUNCIL. HE SUGGESTED THAT WHENEVER SUCH A BRIEFING TAKES PLACE IN WASHINGTON THE COUNCIL SHOULD STILL COVER THE SAME SUBJECT AS WE HAVE DONE TODAY. HE ALSO URGED THAT NOTICE BE GIVEN ADVANCE NOTICE OF SUCH MEETINGS AS WAS DONE IN THIS CASE SO THAT CAPITALS  
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 00483 01 OF 04 310754Z

WILL HAVE TIME TO INFORM THEIR WASHINGTON AMBASSADORS OF THE QUESTIONS OF IMPORTANCE TO THEM AND TO THE ALLIANCE.

3. DE STAERCKE THEN BEGAN A DISCUSSION OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE NATO ALLIES BOTH GENERALLY AND RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID HE DETECTED IN THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION FOUR THEMES WHICH ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO THE WHOLE QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES. FIRST, HE NOTED SECRETARY KISSINGER'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM EXPLOITING WESTERN DISUNITY. SECOND, HE RELATED THIS TO THE SECRETARY'S ANALYSIS OF HOW THE ALLIES SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS EVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOWING CLEARLY THAT DETENTE IS NOT

CONDOMINIUM BUT RESTRAINT. THIRD, DE STAERCKE NOTED THE SECRETARY'S REFERENCE TO HOW EXTREME POSITIONS BY OUTSIDERS ON MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS ARE UNHELPFUL AS WOULD BE ANY ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. FOURTH, DE STAERCKE REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY'S OBSERVATION THAT THE U.S. INTENDED TO KEEP THE ALLIES INFORMED ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS, BUT THAT THE U.S. WOULD APPRECIATE RECIPROCITY.

4. DE STAERCKE SAID THAT IN THESE FOUR POINTS HE SAW THE OUTLINE OF A PHILISOPHY OF CONSULTATION. HE THEN DISCUSSED THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE UNITED STATES FACES IN COPING WITH THE PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION WHILE IT IS A PRIME MOVER IN VERY SENSITIVE NEGOTIATIONS "IN THE FIELD." AFTER EXPRESSING SYMPATHY WITH THIS U.S. DILEMMA, THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT A SOLUTION HAD TO BE FOUND IF THE FOUR GOALS KISSINGER MENTIONED WERE TO BE ACHIEVED, NAMELY THWARTING SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF DISUNITY, KEEPING ALLIES AWARE OF THE NATURE OF DETENTE, KEEPING ALLIES FROM ADOPTING SEPARATE POSITIONS WHICH MIGHT BE DANGEROUS, AND ACHIEVING RECIPROCITY.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 00483 02 OF 04 310752Z

12

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 011511

P R 301930Z JAN 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3646

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 USNATO 483

EXDIS

5. DE STAERCKE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT RUMSFELD HAD A PERSONAL PROBLEM OF TRYING TO KEEP THE ALLIES INFORMED OF THE VIEWS OF HIS GOVERNMENT SO THAT THEIR ACTIONS WILL BE IN LINE WITH HIS GOVERNMENTS'S. HE REFERRED MOST FAVORABLY TO THE NOVEMBER CONSULTATION IN THE COUNCIL WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO, AND THE FACT THAT IT ENABLED ALLIES TO SEE THE RIGHTNESS OF THE U.S. POSITION. HE SAID THAT WHILE HE RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF THE NATO AMBASSAODRS IN WASHINGTON HAVING A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THESE MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS DIRECTLY WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER, AND THAT SOMETIMES SUCH A MEETING IN WASHINGTON IS THE BEST OR THE ONLY CONSULTATIVE FORUM THAT CAN BE ORGANIZED, HE FELT PERSONALLY THAT RUMSFELD

MUST CONTINUE TO FIND WAYS AS HE DID TODAY OF KEEPING THE ALLIES INFORMED IN THE COUNCIL, BECAUSE IT IS ONLY THE COUNCIL THAT THERE IS A REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, AND FOR THE RECIPROCITY THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER SPOKE OF.

6. DE STAERCKE CONCLUDED BY APPEALING TO THE SYG "FOR THE GOOD OF ALL," AS GUARDIAN OF CONSULTATIONS AND IN ORDER TO ENHANCE WESTERN UNITY THAT MEANS BE FOUND TO ENHANCE THE EXCHANGE OF VITAL INFORMATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER SUBJECT IN THE COUNCIL. AND, THAT RUMSFELD MUST FIND WAYS TO KEEP ALLIES INFORMED SO THEY CAN COOPERATE WITH THE U.S.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00483 02 OF 04 310752Z

7. AMBASSADOR CATALANO (ITALY) ECHOED THE GRATITUDE EXPRESSED FOR THE USEFUL BRIEFING, AND SUPPORTED DE STAERCKE'S VIEWS OF THE VALUE OF THE COUNCIL ADDRESSING THESE SUBJECT DIRECTLY WHERE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE "MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND MORE EXHAUSTIVE." HE SAID HE FELT HIS QUESTION HAD NOW BEEN ANSWERED.

8. CHORAFAS (GREEK), NOTING THAT HE WAS THE FIRST TO REQUEST THAT RUMSFELD REPEAT THE JANUARY 25 BRIEFING IN THE COUNCIL, THANKED RUMSFELD FOR THIS "VERY CLEAR AND VERY FULL BRIEFING" AND SAID "WE REJOICE AT THE ENORMOUS SUCCESS OF U.S. DIPLOMACY AND WE AGREE WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF MR. KISSINGER."

9. THE CANADIAN PERMREP (MENZIES) JOINED IN THE THANKS, SAYING THAT WHEN AN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON GOES UNASSISTED INTO A MEETING WITH THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE IT "TESTS HIS ACIENT METTLE" TO PRODUCE A FULL REPORT OF ALL THAT WAS DISCUSSED.

10. MENZIES THEN SAID THAT HE IS STILL A LITTLE PUZZLED AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF NATO AS A FORUM FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST. MENZIES SAID HE THEREFORE WELCOMED DEAN DE STAERCKE'S ANALYSIS AND HE WAS PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY SECRETARY KISSINGER'S MENTION OF THE CONCERTED MIDDLE EAST VIEWPOINT OF THE EC-9. HE REVIEWED AND EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR EC-9 ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL UNITY, NOTING PARTICULARLY ITS RECENT STATEMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WONDERED TO WHAT EXTENT DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE NINE IN THIS CONNECTION SHOULD TAKE PLACE INSIDE THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AS OPPOSED TO SEPARATELY AMONG THEMSELVES OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL. HE RECOGNIZED THE PROBLEM OF IRELAND NOT BEING A MEMBER OF NATO, BUT, MENZIES SAID, HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE OF THESE COUNSULTATIONS TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE COUNCIL. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, HE SAID, WOULD BE "IMPORTANT FOR THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE."

11. RUMSFELD THANKED THE ALLIES FOR THEIR COMMENTS ON SECRETARY KISSINGER'S EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. REFERRING TO DE STAERCKE'S STATEMENT HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT HE RECOGNIZED THE BEGINNING OF WHAT COULD BE A USEFUL DISCUSSION ON CONSULTATION AND WISHING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE RESTRICTED FORUM, SAID HE HAD SOME PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON THE SUBJECT HE WISHED TO SHARE IN AN

EXPLORATORY WAY.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 00483 02 OF 04 310752Z

12. RUMSFELD SPOKE OF HIS OWN REAL SENSE OF PERSONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE SUBJECTS DE STAERCKE HAD MENTIONED. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM IN EACH INSTANCE HOW THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FIFTEEN SHOULD BE MANIFESTED IN THE VARIOUS SITUATIONS THAT COME ALONG. RUMSFELD REFERRED TO THE MANY DISCUSSIONS PERMREPS HAD HAD ON THIS SUBJECT, BOTH FORMALLY AND INFORMALLY, AND TO THE TRADITIONS AND THE PRECEDENTS WHICH OBTAINED IN THE ALLIANCE. IMPLYING NO REPROACH TO ANYONE, HE SAID HE FOUND THAT THE PRECEDENTS AND THE HISTORY ARE IMPERFECT, OR AT LEAST INCOMPLETE, AS A GUIDE TO THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE.

13. TAKING THE PRESENT INSTANCE AND REFLECTING ON RECENT NATO MIDDLE EAST CONSULTATIONS, RUMSFELD REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH LAST APRIL IN WHICH DR. KISSINGER TALKED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE ALLIES AND THAT IT MIGHT BE MODIFIED TO PUT IT ON A SUSTAINABLE BASIS. HE ASID THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS IS ESSENTIAL IN THIS PROCESS AND EVERYONE RECOGNIZED THAT, BUT NONE OF US HAVE YET ANSWERED IT. IN ALL OF THE TEXTS AND DRAFTS OF ALL OF THE ATLANTIC DECLARATIONS THAT ARE BEING PROPOSED HE SEES NO ANSWER TO THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION: "HOW SHOULD THE ALLIES INTERACT IN VIEW OF THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE OVER 25 YEARS.

14. RUMSFELD SAID THAT THE ALLIES HAD RECENTLY TALKED A BIT ABOUT THE ISSUE OF CONSULTATIONS ON SUBJECTS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA, BUT THAT'S AS FAR AS THINGS HAD GONE.

15. MORE SPECIFICALLY, REFERRING TO DISCUSSIONS IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE OCTOBER MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD AT THAT TIME SUGGESTED THAT ASPECTS OF IT OUGHT TO BE DEALT WITH HERE IN THE COUNCIL IN VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC SECURITY IMPLICATIONS TO THE ALLIANCE. HOWEVER, THE FEELING OF THE COUNCIL WAS THAT WHILE THEY WANTED TO HEAR MORE FROM US ON THE SUBJECT THE ALLIES FELT THAT EACH SHOULD GO ITS OWN WAY.

16. EVEN MORE SPECIFICALLY, RUMSFELD SAID THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ILLUSTRATION ONLY, NATO LACKED A PRIOR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OR OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS SOMETHING THAT CONCERNED NATO. HAD THERE BEEN SOME UNDERSTANDING WITHIN NATO, SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE WAY WE  
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 00483 02 OF 04 310752Z

ADDRESS MBFR OR SALT, WHICH WERE DIFFERENT, THE SITUATION AND BEHAVIOR OF THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT NATO SHOULD HAVE HAD SUCH AN AGREEMENT; HE WAS MERELY NOTING THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE IT.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 00483 03 OF 04 310415Z

16

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 008710

P R 301930Z JAN 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3805

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3647

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 USNATO 483

EXDIS

17. IN SALT, RUMSFELD SAID, THE SOVIETS KNOW WHEN THEY WALK INTO A MEETING WITH THE U.S. THAT IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. IS IN EFFECT SAYING "WE HAVE ALLIES AND WE ARE GOING TO TELL THEM WHAT WE TELL YOU AND WHAT YOU TELL US." THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT THAT IS THE SITUATIONS IN SALT; AND THE BEHAVIOR OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN SALT IS GUIDED BY THAT FACT. THAT IS NOT THE SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST. HE ASSUMED THAT WHEN SECRETARY KISSINGER IS ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARABS, THE ISRAELIS, OR OTHER PARTIES, SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING IS NOT PRESENT. THE SECRETARY HAS NOT REVEALED CERTAIN THINGS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, HE WILL NOT, AND HE SHOULD NOT. THAT WAS THE GROUND RULE. RUMSFELD SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT NO ONE HERE WAS SAYING THAT HE SHOULD, BUT HE ONLY WISHED TO MAKE THE POINT ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SITUATIONS: WHEN INTERLOCUTORS OF THE UNITED STATES KNOW THE U.S.'S ATLANTIC ALLIES WILL HAVE FULL ACCESS OR ONLY SELECTIVE ACCESS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATIONS AND OF DEVELOPMENTS.

18. RUMSFELD SAID HE AGREED WITH THE DEAN IN MUCH OF WHAT DE STAERCKE SAID AND THAT HE PARTICULARLY AGREED THAT IT WAS RUMSFELD'S RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE QUALITY, FORM AND INTENSITY OF CONSULTATIONS. RUMSFELD SAID HE IS TRYING TO DO JUST THAT. AND HE FINDS WASHINGTON RESPONSIVE WHEN IT IS CLEAR WHAT IS RE-  
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00483 03 OF 04 310415Z

QUIRED OR DESIRABLE, BUT THAT THAT IS NOT ALWAYS CLEAR.

19. RUMSFELD SAID THAT IN HIS EXPERIENCE AS CHIEF OF THIS MISSION HE HAS FOUND IT QUITE EASY TO DEAL WITH WASHINGTON ON THOSE THINGS WHERE HE HIMSELF UNDERSTANDS WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE AND WHAT IS

RIGHT. HOWEVER, HE SAID IN SOME INSTANCES IT IS NOT CLEAR TO HIM WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE WITH RESPECT TO NATO CONSULTATIONS. RUMSFELD

REFLECTED ON THE HIGHLY COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE ALLIES AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF RELATIONSHIPS AND HOW EACH PERMREP FACED THE TASK OF COMMUNICATING WITH HIS CAPITAL AND ACHIEVING UNDERSTANDING WITH THEN ON HOW TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THESE COMPLEXITIES. RUMSFELD SAID THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO SORT THESE THINGS OUT IN HIS OWN MIND AND THAT HE FEELS THAT HE HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS BUT THAT AS FAR AS HE CAN SEE THE ALLIANCE HASN'T MADE MUCH PROGRESS. HE SAID IN RESPONSE TO THE DEAN THAT THESE WERE PROBLEMS NOT JUST FOR HIMSELF NOR FOR THE SYG BUT THAT WE ALL NEED EACH OTHER'S HELP IN CHARING THE FUTURE AS TO HOW TO DEEPEN AND IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP.

20. RUMSFELD SAID HE HAD TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS. FIRST, OBSERVING THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE DOES NOT EXIST IN BRUSSELS ALONE, HE SAID THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO HAVING CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES TAKE PLACE OTHER THAN IN BRUSSELS. HE SAID THE DISADVANTAGES ARE OBVIOUS. FIRST, THE SYG, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MC, AND KEY PEOPLE ON THE IS ARE CUT OUT OF THE PICTURE, AT LEAST FOR A PERIOD OF DAYS. THAT IS A SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE. SECOND, AS DE STAERCKE HAD NOTED, SUCH CONSULTATION CUTS OUT THE INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY AND OTHER RESOURCES AT THE NATO HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT WHICH FULL CONSULTATIONS MAY BE LESS THAN SATISFACTORY. ON THE OTHER HAND, MAYBE IT IS USEFUL FROM TIME TO TIME TO HAVE CONSULTATIONS ELSEWHERE. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT IN THE INSTANCE AT HAND IT WAS BETTER TO HAVE HAD THE BRIEFING TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON, ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR THE SAME SUBSTANCE BEING REPEATED IN THE COUNCIL.

21. WITH REGARD TO THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NINE AND THE FIFTEEN, RUMSFELD NOTED THAT HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR MENZIES. THE PROBLEM AS HE SAW IT WAS HOW THE INTERESTS AND DESIRES OF THE NINE CAN BE ACHIEVED AT MINIMUM DISADVANTAGE TO THE FIFTEEN. THAT MAY BE A MATTER FOR SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 00483 03 OF 04 310415Z

THE NINE TO DECIDE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BUT THE ANSWER IS NOT UNIMPORTANT TO THE FIFTEEN. YET, HE ADDED, THIS IS NOT SOMETHING WE HAVE DISCUSSED. IT SIMPLY LURKS THERE BEHIND OUR RELATIONSHIPS.

22. SYG LUNS SAID HE TOO HAS THOUGHT LONG\*ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF HOW THE ALLIANCE REACTS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. LUNS EXPRESSED PRAISE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON HIS WORK IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THANKED RUMSFELD FOR HIS THOUGHT ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS. LUNS CONTINUED THAT ON REFLECTION THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED IMMEDIATELY AS HAVING A DIRECT IMPACT ON THE ALLIANCE. IN FACT, HE SAID "WE DID NOT SEE A SPLENDID EXAMPLE OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY." THE U.S., HE CONTINUED, HAS A RIGHT TO EXPECT THAT IN THIS

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION OTHER ALLIES SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE INFORMATION AND CONSULT WITH THEIR PARTNERS ABOUT ACTIONS WHICH THEY ARE UNDERTAKING OR CONTEMPLATING. LUNS SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT SOLIDARITY AND RECIPROCITY RUN PARALLEL. HE THOUGHT THAT COUNTRIES THAT TAKE INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD INFORM THE COUNCIL OF THOSE INITIATIVES, EVEN IF THEY ARE UNPOPULAR ONES.

23. LUNS CONCLUDED SAYING THAT IN HIS OPINION KISSINGER WAS RIGHT IN THIS INSTANCE IN BRIEFING THE NATO AMBASSADORS IN LOCO IN WASHINGTON, BUT THAT RUMSFELD WAS ALSO RIGHT TO REPEAT THAT BRIEFING HERE. HE AGAIN EXPRESSED THE THANKS OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS AND THEIR HOPE THAT IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS IN THE FUTURE THE U.S. WOULD ACT IN A SIMILAR FASHION.

24. THE UK PERMREP (PECK) SAID HE JOINED IN THANKS TO SECRETARY KISSINGER AND TO DE STAERCKE FOR INITIATING THIS DISCUSSION, BUTHE PARTICULARLY THANKED RUMSFELD FOR SHARING WITH THE COUNCIL HIS OWN PERSONAL THOUGHT ON THESE PROBLEMS. HE WISHED TO CONTRIBUTE HIS OWN THOUGHT WHICH WAS THAT, EVEN AT THE RISK OF "CRYING WOLF" THE ALLIES SHOULD, IF ANY ONE OF THEM SEES A SITUATION BOILING UP SOMEWHERE, CALL IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE OTHERS AND CALL FOR ALLIANCE DISCUSSION OF IT. HE AGREED WITH RUMSFELD THAT WE SHOULD LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND SAID WE MUST AVOID CONSULTING ON THE LAST PROBLEM JUST AS MILITARY MEN MUST AVOID FIGHTING THE LAST WAR. LUNS SAID HE AGREED AND FELT THAT THE CHAIRMAN COULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN SUCH SITUATIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 00483 03 OF 04 310415Z

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 00483 04 OF 04 310413Z

12

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 008713

P R 301930Z JAN 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3806

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3648

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 USNATO 483

EXDIS



25. DE STAERCKE AGREED WITH MUCH THAT HAD BEEN SAID. HE ASKED ALL HIS COLLEAGUES TO REREAD THE 1956 REPORT OF THE THREE WISE MEN, PARTICULARLY PARA 94, ON THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION. DE STAERCKE OBSERVED THAT AT THAT TIME THOSE WORDS HAD A GREAT VALUE FOR THE FUTURE, BUT NOW THEY HAVE A VALUE THAT IS TOPICAL.

26. MENZIES ADDED HIS PERSONAL THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS AT SOME STAGE THE COUNCIL MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS OR TO INITIATE AN SPC STUDY OF IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF THE REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

27. THE NETHERLANDS PERMREP (HARTOGH) FIRST EXPRESSED HIS ADMIRATION OF WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD ACCOMPLISHED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE THEN ADDED THAT IN THE THREE AND A HALF WEEKS SINCE HE HAS TAKEN OVER AS NETHERLANDS PERMREP HE HAS HEARD A LOT OF STORIES ABOUT THE LACK OF INFORMATION AND THE LACK OF CONSULTATIONS HERE AT NATO ON THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. ADMITTING HE WAS NEW TO THE QUESTION, HIS WISE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS WAS THAT "IT WAS NOT THAT MORE CONSULTATIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING, BUT THAT MORE UNDERSTANDING IS NEEDED IN ORDER TO IMPROVE CONSULTATIONS." HE WENT ON TO OBSERVE THAT THERE ARE MANY THINGS THAT ARE HAPPENING BILATERALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH HE READS  
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00483 04 OF 04 310413Z

ABOUT ONLY IN THE NEWSPAPERS (REFERRING TO JOBERT'S REMARKS IN DAMASCUS). HE WONDERED WHY THE ALLIES INVOLVED WERE NOT DISCUSSING THEM HERE IN THE COUNCIL. HARTOGH THOUGH THAT IF THE COUNCIL HAD THESE THINGS UNDER DISCUSSION, THAT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY START THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION.

28. LUNS SUMMARIZED, IN SAYING THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT CONSULTATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, SHOULD NO LONGER BE A ONE-WAY STREET. ALL ALLIES SHOULD SHARE INFORMATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.  
RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 11 JUN 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 30 JAN 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974ATO00483  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS, 12-31-82  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740173/abbrysxv.tel  
**Line Count:** 471  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** (A) STATE 019377 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 017688 (NOTAL), (C) STATE 017687 (NODIS), (D) STATE 017633 (NOTAL)  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 01 APR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <01 APR 2002 by kellew0>; APPROVED <30 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** 1) BRIEFING NATO ON MIDDLE EAST, AND 2) GENERAL QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIES  
**TAGS:** PFOR, XT, XF, NATO, ENRG  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
DUBLIN  
EC BRUSSELS RUFHBS  
GENEVA  
USUN NY  
**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005